Tachyon paradoxes, including causality paradoxes, have persisted within tachyon theories and left little hope for the existence of observable tachyons. This paper presents a way to solve the causality paradoxes, along with two other paradoxes, by the introduction of an absolute frame of reference in which a tachyon effect may never precede its cause. Relativity for ordinary matter is unaffected by this, even if the tachyons couple to ordinary particles. Violations of the principle of relativity due to the absolute frame (...) would appear only in the case of free tachyons. (shrink)

In response to this issue’s theme of Can robots be sensual? two propositions are discussed from a design researcher’s perspective. Four devices across two speculative projects Habitat Robots and Soil Protector Robots are presented. Speculative Realist ideas provide reasoning for design approaches to metaphorise sensed environmental data into multi-sensorial performances that the devices embody. Facilitated through the projects are philosophy of design concerns, such as asymmetrical relations, the nature of data, and language about the devices prefiguring sensorial expectations. The performative (...) behaviours of these multi-sensorial robots evoke a sense of things by removing the truthiness of data and thereby emancipating language from privilege and expertise, subverting expectations of technology, and notions of urban Nature. Through Harman’s Quadruple Object, we speculate on asymmetricality within object relations, including between the devices and the practices of design itself. Thereby, allowing ontological design implications to be reviewed – where acts of designing in turn design us; design processes are not only entwined prefiguratively, but are companion output artefacts of these technological ecology interfaces. The devices bring together and physicalise questions of contextual boundaries and politics between humans, technology, and Nature. (shrink)

Crucifixion and Death as Spectacle: Umayyad Crucifixion in Its Late Antique Context. By Sean W. Anthony. American Oriental Series, vol. 96. New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2014. Pp. x + 99. $39.50.

A combinatorial result about internal subsets of *N is proved using the Lebesgue Density Theorem. This result is then used to prove a standard theorem about difference sets of natural numbers which provides a partial answer to a question posed by Erdös and Graham.

Background -- Overview of legal sources -- Summary of recent prosecutions and investigations -- Applications of law and professional and trade association standards to physician relationships with industry -- Legal and ethical aspects of specific physician's industry financial relationships -- Approaching and adopting effective compliance plans.

In 1977 the Consultative Group on Ethics with Respect to Research Involving the Use of Human Subjects submitted its report to the Canada Council. Shortly thereafter the report was published under the title Ethics: Report of the Consultative Group on Ethics. Upon publication it was distributed to academic institutions in Canada with an invitation for reaction and response.

The five factor trait of conscientiousness is a supertrait, denoting on one hand a pattern of excessive labor, rigidity, orderliness and compulsivity, and on the other hand a pattern of strict rectitude, scrupulosity, dutifulness and morality. In both respects the obsessive-compulsive personality is conscientious; indeed, it has been labeled a disorder of extreme conscientiousness. Antisocial personality disorder, in the present paper, is described as occupying the opposite end of the conscientiousness continuum. The antisocial is impulsive rather than compulsive, illicit rather (...) than licit, and furtive rather than forthright.After clinically comparing the obsessive and antisocial personalities, the present paper invokes evolutionary theory to explain their resultant behavioral, ideological, political and demographic differences. (shrink)

Rockefeller (religion and philosophy, Middlebury College) combines biography and intellectual history in an introduction to the philosophy of Dewey (1859-1952) which emphasizes the evolution of the religious faith and moral vision at the heart of his thought. Annotation copyright Book News, Inc. Po.

Two different equivalence relations on countable nonstandard models of the natural numbers are considered. Properties of a standard sequence A are correlated with topological properties of the equivalence classes of the transfer of A. This provides a method for translating results from analysis into theorems about sequences of natural numbers.

A collaboration with Cuban Artists. Poder is the first in a series of three books exploring issues confronting Cubans daily. Six meetings in Havana over 2.5 years- two weeks of very hard work.Power rules.We are born and are powerful because in our relationships and connections, communication and contacts, we exercise that special force/energy (Power) with which all of us without exception come into this world.Force is physical, Power is intellectual. By making art and putting together this book we have chosen (...) our way to relate to Power. All prints included illustrate, different aspects of The Relationships of Power in its various dimensions: the power of the mind, willpower, financial, military, economic power, the power of authority, social power, physical or mystical . . .After all Power is a natural condition.Yamilys Brito JorgeApril 2010. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69. DID BEATTIE DEFER TO HUME? Robert Paul Wolff, in his essay, "Kant's Debt to Hume Via Beattie," points out a 'rather interesting mistake ' made by Norman Kemp Smith in his Commentary to Kànt's Critique of Pure Reason. In the Commentary Kemp Smith considers the similarities of the respective theories of self of Kant and Hume and finds it intriguing that the two philosophers agree"...that there is no (...) single empirical« 2 state of the self which is constant throughout experience". In spite of this agreement of doctrine Kemp Smith insists Kant must have arrived at his conclusions independently of any reading of Hume. We are told this is so because "Hume's view of the self is not developed in the Enquiry, and is 3 not mentioned by Beattie". And since, as Kemp Smith argues, Kant had only the Enquiry and certain passages of Hume's Treatise as quoted by James Beattie in An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth available to him, this agreement must be considered an accident rather than evidence of an 4 influence of Hume on Kant. Here then is the 'interesting mistake'. Wolff does not wish to dispute the more or less canonical assessment that Kant's knowledge of Hume rested on first hand acquaintance with the Enquiry and Beattie' s Essay rather than the Treatise. However, Wolff does want to question Kemp Smith's account of how much Hume Kant could have gleaned from Beattie. Kemp Smith tells us that in the Essay Beattie says nothing of Hume's theory of self. But as every reader of the Essay knows Beattie spent no less than six pages on Hume's discussion of self and personality, and considered it very important: at least important enough that he seems to have felt that a mere description of Hume on the self would serve as a reductio on the Humean body of beliefs. Still, according to Wolff, what appears to be a mistake made by Kemp Smith turns out not to be one at all. Wolff infers from the 1776 date of Beattie' s Essay which 70. Kemp Smith cites that he was working from the sixth edition, the edition which Beattie, responding to Hume's attempt in the Advertisement for the Enquiries to deny responsibility for the Treatise, "...altered his discussion of Hume's philosophy so that his criticism would not apply to the Treatise alone". Such an alteration of the Essay meant, according to Wolff, making the topics of the Essay line up in number and content with those of the Hume's Enquiry. But as we all know Hume does not discuss personal identity in the Enquiry. Thus this topic is omitted from the sixth edition of Beattie's Essay. And thus Kemp Smith's "mistake" turns out not to be one at all. Even if this dissolution by Wolff of what appears to be a mistake by Kemp Smith were correct we would still have puzzles to contend with. For example, the discussion of causation in the Enquiry has long been recognized to differ? significantly from that of the Treatise. One would then expect that Wolff would also cite some change in the sixth edition of the Essay on this score. Yet Wolff does not mention any alteration in the sixth edition account of causation, and in fact a comparison of the relevant sections of the sixth with an earlier edition will not yield any significant difference in the texts. But, be this as it may, where before we had one seeming mistake and the promise of its being dissolved, we now have two strange mistakes both irresolvable. For the discussion of Hume on personal identity which Wolff and Kemp Smith say does not occur in the edition of Beattie's Essay of 1776 is really there, substantially unchanged from earlier editions. For the sake of completeness it should be noted also that even though Wolff refers only to the sixth edition printed in 1776 there are also at least three other printings of the sixth edition (in 1777, 1778 and 1805), but this makes little difference since Beattie's treatment of the topic of personal identity... (shrink)

"The common purpose of the exhibition and symposium is to foster ways of imagining and living in the natural world that join scientific understanding with life-affirming moral values and world-affirming religious values."--Introduction.

After more than a decade of reflection on obedience experiments based on a laboratory model of his own design, the social psychologist Stanley Milgram is clearly confident that the experimental results make a substantial and striking contribution towards understanding human nature:Something … dangerous is revealed: the capacity for man to abandon his humanity, indeed, the inevitability that he does so, as he merges his unique personality into larger institutional structures.

(1986). Individual Responsibility, Nuclear Deterrence, and Excusing Political Inaction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 16, Supplementary Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Disarmament, pp. 213-236.

The Khārijites in Early Islamic Historical Tradition: Heroes and Villains. By Hannah-Lena Hagemann. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021. Pp. xii + 316. $110, £85.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Phenomenology and Modern Behavioral PsychologyLindsay B. Fletcher (bio) and Steven C. Hayes (bio)Keywordsacceptance, contextualism, defusion, relational-frame-theoryPérez-Álvarez and Sass (2008) deserve praise for examining the philosophical roots of clinical psychological science. Modern psychology has moved away from the development of philosophy and theory that is needed to ground scientific investigation within a coherent system. The result is increasingly ill-defined constructs and research programs that each operate within their own (...) divergent paradigm. B.F. Skinner is one of the few modern experimental behavioral psychologists who attempted to build a coherent science of behavior based on observable events with testable hypotheses. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson 1999) and its associated basic science of cognition, Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche 2001), build on Skinner’s work to produce a more progressive science.Psychology and philosophy are different disciplines and how they are approached is defined by the objective. The purpose of philosophy from a scientific point of view is not the same as from a philosophical point of view. It is fine to compare radical behaviorism and phenomenology, but it seems important to ask whether and how this will lead to a more progressive science of behavior.In this commentary, we discuss the philosophy and theory that underlie ACT/RFT and show how they reflect on the relevant points made by the authors regarding the shared features of phenomenology and radical behaviorism. We make two adjustments to the explanation of radical behavioral concepts presented in the current paper to create a more coherent analysis. Finally, we show here how the development of a theory based on applied goals directly informs the methods used in clinical settings.Philosophical AssumptionsThe field of behavior analysis that originated with Skinner has different strands. Some are holistic and pragmatic, whereas others are elementalistic and mechanistic (Hayes, Hayes, and Reese 1988). ACT is based on an a-ontological philosophy termed functional contextualism (Hayes 1993), which views behavior analysis from a holistic and pragmatic perspective. Functional contextualism (AKA radical behaviorism) shares some of the assumptions of phenomenology, as has long been noted (Day 1969). For example, Pérez-Álvarez and Sass (2008) identify a-dualism, or monism, as a common feature. In functional contextualism, the whole is divided into functional units for the purpose of prediction and influence. A three-term contingency (antecedent–behavior–consequence) in behavior analysis is viewed as a [End Page 255] whole event with pragmatically distinguishable aspects, not an assemblage. As the authors point out, this results in a dialectic tension between stimulus control, action, and reinforcer because none are distinct units, and each is defined with reference to the others much as the front of a coin cannot exist without the back. These are not ontological entities, but functional units that are abstracted from the whole for pragmatic purposes. What is “radical” about radical behaviorism is that the philosopher, psychologist, or researcher participates in the event they are observing, and their own acts of scientific observation are identified based on their own functional properties.Behavioral ThinkingIn the service of further developing this philosophical and theoretical foundation and considering it along side phenomenology, we need to examine two aspects of the target article. The first regards the role of the environment in shaping behavior that is central to behavioral and contextual theories. The authors object to behaviorism’s notion of environment and suggest replacing it with the concept of the world, stating that “animals have environment, but man has world.” What is missing is an account of that shift. We believe that modern behavior analysis provides that account.Similarly, the paper argues that “reinforcers are not just things that follow behavior, but also, and above all, values that guide our life.” Again what is missing is an account of the precise behavioral basis for the distinction.In an attempt to do this, the authors incorrectly analyze operant behavior as future oriented, even appealing to final causality. In the three-term contingency, the discriminative stimulus sets the occasion for reinforcement of a particular behavior. The behavior of interest has been reinforced in similar contexts in the past, which gives... (shrink)